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Scoped Vulnerability Tracking

Here's a thinking process:

1. Analyze User Request:

2. Examine the Provided Data:

The data is structured as a JSON object with:

Wait, let me carefully read the sorting rule: "Entries within each system are ALREADY SORTED (KEV-confirmed first, then CVSS descending) -- present them in this order, do not re-sort."

I need to check if any entries have `confirmed_exploited_by_cisa_kev` flag. Looking at the data, I don't see any field named `confirmed_exploited_by_cisa_kev` in the entries. The descriptions don't mention KEV status either. The prompt says: "a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks a merely high-CVSS entry, since it's confirmed exploitation vs. theoretical severity." But the data doesn't explicitly mark KEV entries. I need to check if any description or reference implies KEV. Looking through: None of the entries mention CISA KEV explicitly. The `CVE-2026-60163` references Oracle CPU Jul 2026, but not KEV. The `CVE-2026-91851` has null CVSS. I should note that if no entry is confirmed KEV, I won't add the 🔴 tag. But the prompt says "a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks..." - this is about priority ordering, not necessarily that there are KEV entries. The data is "already sorted (KEV-confirmed first, then CVSS descending)". Since none seem to be KEV-confirmed in the data, I'll just present them as given, without the KEV tag unless explicitly marked. Wait, the prompt says: "add '🔴 ACTIVELY EXPLOITED (CISA KEV)' if confirmed_exploited_by_cisa_kev is true". The data doesn't have that field. I should probably not add it, or maybe I should check if any reference implies KEV. Safer to not add it if not present. But the prompt might expect me to know or mark based on references? No, it says "if confirmed_exploited_by_cisa_kev is true". Since it's not in the data, I'll omit the tag. However, the executive summary must highlight the single most urgent item, with "a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks a merely high-CVSS entry". If none are KEV-confirmed, then the most urgent would be the highest CVSS among them. I need to identify the highest CVSS score across all systems, or if any is KEV. Looking at CVSS scores: MySQL has 10.0 (CVE-2026-59971), 9.1, 8.6, 8.4, 7.5, 7.5, 7.3, 4.4, 4.3, null. PostgreSQL has 8.8, 8.1, 7.5, 4.4. MongoDB has 7.7, 6.5. The highest is 10.0 for MySQL CVE-2026-59971. But wait, the description for CVE-2026-59971 says "MySQL MCP Server...". It has cvss_score 10.0, severity CRITICAL. No KEV tag mentioned. I'll assume no KEV entries in this dataset, so the most urgent is the highest CVSS, which is 10.0 for MySQL CVE-2026-59971. But the prompt says "highlighting the single most urgent item (a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks a merely high-CVSS entry)". Since there are no KEV-confirmed entries, I'll highlight the highest CVSS entry, but I should note that no KEV entries are present, or just pick the highest CVSS. Actually, the prompt might be testing if I can identify that none are KEV, but still follow the structure. I'll produce the executive summary highlighting the most urgent based on the data: the CVE with CVSS 10.0, noting it's the highest severity, and since no KEV entries are confirmed in the dataset, it's the most urgent by CVSS. But to be precise, I'll state the most urgent item is the CVE-2026-59971 with CVSS 10.0, and mention that no CISA KEV-confirmed entries are present in this batch, so it takes priority as highest CVSS.

Wait, let re-read: "One-paragraph executive summary, highlighting the single most urgent item (a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks a merely high-CVSS entry, since it's confirmed exploitation vs. theoretical severity)." This means if there's a KEV entry, it should be highlighted over a higher CVSS? No, "a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks a merely high-CVSS entry". So if there's any KEV entry, it becomes the most urgent. If multiple KEV entries, probably the highest CVSS among KEV or first sorted. Since none are marked KEV, I'll highlight the highest CVSS entry, but I should probably note the absence of KEV entries. However, the prompt says "Do not fabricate CVE IDs, scores, version numbers, or details beyond what's given above." So I can't invent a KEV status. I'll look at the data again: Is there any field `confirmed_exploited_by_cisa_kev`? Not in the shown data. The data structure in the prompt doesn't include that field. The JSON only has `id`, `description`, `cvss_score`, `cvss_severity`, `published`, `last_modified`, `references`. No KEV flag. So I must assume none are KEV-confirmed for the purpose of this report, unless the references imply it. The references for CVE-2026-60163 include Oracle CPU, which might have KEV, but not explicitly. I'll proceed without KEV tags.

Next: Systems to include: MySQL, PostgreSQL, MongoDB. All have formal vulnerability entries. The prompt says "Skip any system with no formal vulnerability entries." All three have entries.

Sorting: "Entries within each system are ALREADY SORTED (KEV-confirmed first, then CVSS descending) -- present them in this order, do not re-sort." I need to present them in the order given in the data, which appears already sorted by priority (KEV first, but none are KEV, so just the order given). I'll present MySQL entries in the order they appear in the array, same for PostgreSQL, MongoDB.

Limit: "If a system has more than 10 entries, only the top 10 by priority are included; say so if relevant, don't imply completeness." MySQL has 11 entries. So I need to include only top 10, and say so. Let count MySQL entries:

1. CVE-2026-59971

2. CVE-2026-50006

3. CVE-2026-54628

4. CVE-2026-60163

5. CVE-2026-54629

6. CVE-2026-72708

7. CVE-2026-75092

8. CVE-2026-55650

9. CVE-2026-90935

10. CVE-2026-91851

That's 10 entries. Wait, let me count from the data:

Actually, there are exactly 10 MySQL entries listed. Let me check the data again:

The MySQL array starts with CVE-2026-59971, then 50006, 54628, 60163, 54629, 72708, 75092, 55650, 90935, 91851. That's 10 entries. But the prompt says "If a system has more than 10 entries, only the top 10 by priority are included; say so if relevant, don't imply completeness." Since there are exactly 10, I include all, no need to say "top 10". However, I should double-check if there might be more not shown? The data shows 10. I'll include all 10.

PostgreSQL has 5 entries. MongoDB has 2. Both under 10, include all.

News & Community Mentions: The prompt says "Only include this subsection if there's news/forum data below." There is a `NEWS/FORUM MENTIONS` section with PostgreSQL entries (2 items). I need to include it if there's data. The structure says: "A short bullet list per system: one line per item with a 1-sentence plain-English gist, the source name, and the link. Label this unverified chatter, separate from the Formal Vulnerabilities above." I'll include a `### News & Community Mentions` subsection, but only for systems that have news data. The provided news data is under "PostgreSQL" with 2 items. I'll format them as bullets per system, but since they're all PostgreSQL, I'll list them. I need to "Label this unverified chatter, separate from the Formal Vulnerabilities above." I'll add a note or prefix that it's unverified chatter.

Now, let's structure the report.

Executive Summary: One paragraph, highlighting single most urgent item. I'll identify the most urgent as the highest CVSS entry across all systems, considering no KEV entries. That's MySQL CVE-2026-59971 with CVSS 10.0 (CRITICAL). I'll mention it's the most urgent, and note that no CISA KEV-confirmed entries are present in this dataset, so it takes priority by CVSS score. I need to be careful: the prompt says "a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks a merely high-CVSS entry". Since there are none, I'll just highlight the highest CVSS, but maybe I should state that no KEV entries are confirmed, so the most urgent is the CVSS 10.0 entry. To align with the prompt's emphasis, I'll structure the summary to highlight that item, and perhaps mention the KEV aspect absent.

Let's draft the executive summary paragraph:

"This digest covers 22 newly identified database vulnerabilities across MySQL, PostgreSQL, and MongoDB, with no CISA KEV-confirmed actively exploited entries detected in the current dataset. The single most urgent item is CVE-2026-59971 affecting the MySQL MCP Server, carrying a CVSS 10.0 (CRITICAL) score and enabling unauthenticated database disclosure, modification, and potential file-level compromise via DNS rebinding or direct SQL execution through the MCP transport. All other entries range from CRITICAL to MEDIUM severity, with the highest non-KEV CVSS scores concentrated in MySQL and PostgreSQL integrations."

Wait, the prompt says "highlighting the single most urgent item (a CISA KEV-confirmed entry always outranks a merely high-CVSS entry, since it's confirmed exploitation vs. theoretical severity)." I need to make sure the executive summary highlights the most urgent item according to that rule. If there's no KEV entry, then the most urgent is the highest CVSS, but I should perhaps note that no KEV entries are present, so the highest CVSS takes the top spot. I'll phrase it carefully.

Now, Formal Vulnerabilities section.

For each system, I'll list entries in the order they appear (already sorted). For each entry, I need:

`#### [System Name] — [CVE ID] (CVSS [score or "UNSCORED"] [severity]) [add "🔴 ACTIVELY EXPLOITED (CISA KEV)" if confirmed_exploited_by_cisa_kev is true]`

Then Summary, Affected Features / Interoperability, Source, Actions (Fix, Workaround, Tradeoff).

Let's process each entry.

MySQL entries (10 total, all 10 included):

1. CVE-2026-59971

2. CVE-2026-50006

3. CVE-2026-54628

4. CVE-2026-60163

5. CVE-2026-54629

6. CVE-2026-72708 (SPIP)

7. CVE-2026-75092 (leapp)

8. CVE-2026-55650 (Outerbase Studio)

9. CVE-2026-90935 (Froxlor)

10. CVE-2026-91851 (MISP)

Now PostgreSQL entries (5 total):

1. CVE-2026-82028 (Magistrala)

2. CVE-2026-87016 (Open WebUI)

3. CVE-2026-72708 (SPIP) - duplicate across systems? The data includes it in both MySQL and PostgreSQL sections? Actually, CVE-2026-72708 appears in MySQL entries (item 6) and also in PostgreSQL entries? Let's check: In the provided data, CVE-2026-72708 is listed under MySQL (entry 6), and also under PostgreSQL (entry 3). The prompt says "Entries within each system are ALREADY SORTED... present them in this order, do not re-sort." It also says "Do not fabricate CVE IDs, scores, version numbers, or details beyond what's given above." Since it appears in both MySQL and PostgreSQL arrays as separate entries with the same ID but possibly same or different descriptions? Looking at the data: Under MySQL, CVE-2026-72708 description is about SPIP blind SQL injection across MySQL, SQLite, PostgreSQL backends. Under PostgreSQL, the same CVE-2026-72708 appears with the same description. This is a duplicate entry across systems. The prompt's data structure has it in both arrays. I need to treat them as separate entries per system, because the structure groups by system. The prompt says "For EACH entry:" under each system. So I'll include it under both MySQL and PostgreSQL as they appear. However, I must be careful not to double-count or misrepresent. The prompt says "Do not fabricate... beyond what's given above." Since it's given in both arrays, I'll present it in both, but note that it's the same CVE. Actually, the prompt's data has it in MySQL array and PostgreSQL array. I'll include it in both sections as separate `####` entries, because the structure is per system. The sorting rule says "Entries within each system are ALREADY SORTED... present them in this order". So under MySQL, it's in its position; under PostgreSQL, it's in its position. I'll just follow the data exactly.

4. CVE-2026-55650 (Outerbase Studio) - also appears in PostgreSQL array? Yes, entry 5 under PostgreSQL is also CVE-2026-55650, same description as MySQL entry 8. Again, duplicate across systems. I'll include it under PostgreSQL as given.

5. Wait, let's recount PostgreSQL entries from the data:

That's 4 entries? Let me check the PostgreSQL array in the data:

```

"PostgreSQL": [

{

"id": "CVE-2026-82028",

...

},

{

"id": "CVE-2026-87016",

...

},

{

"id": "CVE-2026-72708",

...

},

{

"id": "CVE-2026-55650",

...

}

]

```

Actually, there are 4 entries in PostgreSQL array. But earlier I thought 5. Let me re-examine the prompt's data block. The PostgreSQL array starts after MySQL, and I see four objects: CVE-2026-82028, CVE-2026-87016, CVE-2026-72708, CVE-2026-55650. Yes, 4 entries. MongoDB has 2. So total systems: MySQL 10, PostgreSQL 4, MongoDB 2. All under limits.

Now, for PostgreSQL entries, I need to generate the same fields.

PostgreSQL 1: CVE-2026-82028 (Magistrala)

PostgreSQL 2: CVE-2026-87016 (Open WebUI)

PostgreSQL 3: CVE-2026-72708 (SPIP)

PostgreSQL 4: CVE-2026-55650 (Outerbase Studio)

Now MongoDB entries (2 total):

1. CVE-2026-55253 (LangChain MongoDB)

2. CVE-2026-82076 (MongoDB Server)

Cloud Security

Executive Summary: The most urgent items this cycle are two CRITICAL (CVSS 9.8) vulnerabilities in Kubernetes ecosystem components: Apache Camel K (CVE-2026-80352) and Traefik (CVE-2026-88877), both enabling unauthorized access through distinct vectors—YAML-based code injection and authentication bypass, respectively. No CISA KEV-confirmed entries appear in this scope; all threats below represent theoretical severity rather than confirmed active exploitation. Docker also carries a CRITICAL (CVSS 9.6) IBM Langflow SSRF-to-RCE chain and a HIGH (CVSS 7.8) Apache Storm worker-launcher privilege escalation issue that warrant prompt attention.

Formal Vulnerabilities

KubernetesCVE-2026-80352CVSS 9.8 · CRITICAL

Summary: Apache Camel K contains a YAML injection vulnerability in custom resource configuration. An authorized CR author can inject arbitrary Kubernetes objects, potentially enabling unauthorized resource creation with the operator's privileges.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Camel K custom resource definitions and operator reconciliation pipeline. Any workload relying on CR-based configuration (integrations, deployments, routes) could be subverted to create resources outside intended scope.

Source: https://camel.apache.org/security/CVE-2026-80352.html, http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/10/15

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-88877CVSS 9.8 · CRITICAL

Summary: In Traefik v3.7.0–v3.7.11, the Kubernetes ingress-nginx provider mishandles Ingresses carrying both an authentication annotation and the `nginx.ingress.kubernetes.io/from-to-www-redirect` annotation. A sibling router is created that matches on host alone, lacks terminal redirect handling, and proxies requests to the protected backend with all annotation-derived middlewares (including authentication and source-IP allowlisting) stripped.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Traefik ingress routing for Ingress resources using both auth and redirect annotations. Authentication (e.g., BasicAuth), source-IP filtering, and any other annotation-derived middleware are bypassed for matching requests.

Source: https://github.com/traefik/traefik/security/advisories/GHSA-cjr6-pf59-jq29, https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/traefik-3.7.0-authentication-bypass-via-from-to-www-redirect

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-53713CVSS 9.1 · CRITICAL

Summary: Envoy Gateway's Lua validator (`to_absolute_normalized_path`) fails to collapse redundant path separators before evaluating critical paths, allowing submitted Lua through `EnvoyExtensionPolicy` during default Strict validation to read arbitrary files from the gateway controller pod—including Kubernetes service-account tokens, TLS certificates, and environment data.

Affected Features / Interoperability: EnvoyExtensionPolicy resource processing, gateway controller security posture. Disclosed credentials can subsequently access the Kubernetes API Server or Gateway xDS server.

Source: https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9171, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9172, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/commit/5a78db82b7cf4fc5bebbeda2c50952892038a464

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-47701CVSS 7.7 · HIGH

Summary: OpenTelemetry Operator's TargetAllocator (with `targetAllocator.prometheusCR.enabled: true`) preserves a ServiceMonitor endpoint's `bearerTokenFile` value as an HTTP authorization credential. A tenant who can create or update a matching ServiceMonitor can point it at a file in the Collector pod (e.g., the service-account token) and direct scraping to a tenant-controlled endpoint, leaking the Collector's credentials.

Affected Features / Interoperability: OpenTelemetry Collector scraping, Prometheus CR integration, ServiceMonitor endpoint configuration. The DenyFSAccessThroughSMs control was absent, enabling disclosure of the Collector's service-account JWT.

Source: https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-operator/pull/5104, https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-operator/releases/tag/v0.152.0, https://github.com/open-telemetry/opentelemetry-operator/security/advisories/GHSA-cxh2-4639-vmc5

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-53714CVSS 7.4 · HIGH

Summary: Envoy Gateway's xDS gRPC server in GatewayNamespaceMode installs a JWT StreamInterceptor but no UnaryInterceptor, leaving all unary Fetch RPCs unauthenticated. The streaming interceptor also fails to validate `DiscoveryRequest` (State-of-the-World) messages due to a type assertion failure. Any pod reaching port 18000 can retrieve TLS private keys, all xDS resources, backend endpoints, and routing configuration without authentication.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Envoy Gateway xDS control plane (StreamSecrets, StreamAggregatedResources, StreamClusters, StreamEndpoints, StreamRoutes, StreamListeners). All gateway configuration and credential data exposed via unauthenticated gRPC paths.

Source: https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/8986, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9116, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/commit/4df0809ff1ed59ffb09604da4084335b8c6647c5

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-53716CVSS 6.5 · MEDIUM

Summary: Envoy Gateway's controller reads a tenant-controlled Wasm payload URL and decompresses it without limiting output size. A small gzip stream can force a multi-gigabyte memory allocation in the shared controller, causing OOM termination, controller restart, and potentially a persistent cross-tenant control-plane outage.

Affected Features / Interoperability: EnvoyExtensionPolicy Wasm plugin loading, shared gateway controller stability. A single tenant can cause cluster-wide control-plane disruption.

Source: https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9171, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9172

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-53717CVSS 6.5 · MEDIUM

Summary: Envoy Gateway's controller follows tenant-controlled Wasm image URLs and uses untrusted tar-header `h.Size` values to allocate memory before validation. A crafted tar header can claim multi-terabyte size, causing unrecoverable Go runtime OOM. Since the CR persists, the controller repeatedly crash-loops, causing cluster-wide control-plane denial of service.

Affected Features / Interoperability: EnvoyExtensionPolicy Wasm plugin binary fetching, shared gateway controller reconciliation loop. Single-request, non-volumetric cluster-wide outage.

Source: https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9171, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9172

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-53719CVSS 6.5 · MEDIUM

Summary: Envoy Gateway's `translateSecurityPolicyForRoute` dereferences a nil authorization value when a namespace-scoped tenant creates a SecurityPolicy targeting a TCPRoute without `spec.authorization`. The persistent object panics on every reconcile; while the process stays alive, the controller stalls xDS and infrastructure IR publishing. The data plane continues serving last-known-good config.

Affected Features / Interoperability: SecurityPolicy resource processing, TCPRoute integration, controller xDS publishing pipeline. Tenant-created objects can stall control-plane configuration distribution cluster-wide.

Source: https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9171, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9172

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-53718CVSS 6.4 · MEDIUM

Summary: An HTTPRoute can use an extension-managed `custom backendRef` to reference a backend resource in another namespace without a matching Gateway API ReferenceGrant. The validation logic omits `validateBackendNamespace`, violating the Gateway API cross-namespace authorization model.

Affected Features / Interoperability: HTTPRoute routing, cross-namespace backend references, Gateway API ReferenceGrant authorization model. Routes can bind to backend resources without the backend namespace owner's consent.

Source: https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9171, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9172

Actions:

KubernetesCVE-2026-54246CVSS 5.7 · MEDIUM

Summary: Skipper's routesrv component serves cluster-wide control-plane data without application-layer authentication through `/routes`, `/routes/{zone}`, `/swarm/redis/shards`, and `/swarm/valkey/shards`. A compromised pod reaching routesrv on the cluster network can read Ingress/RouteGroup backend URLs, OAuth/OIDC path details, and Redis/Valkey shard addresses across namespaces.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Skipper routesrv HTTP endpoints, Ingress and RouteGroup configuration data, Redis/Valkey cluster topology. NetworkPolicy can restrict reachability but does not address the missing authentication.

Source: https://github.com/zalando/skipper/pull/4056, https://github.com/zalando/skipper/releases/tag/v0.27.13, https://github.com/zalando/skipper/security/advisories/GHSA-5587-2x54-jj6h

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-12944CVSS 9.6 · CRITICAL

Summary: IBM Langflow OSS 1.0.0–1.10.0 allows attackers to execute arbitrary Python code as root (UID=0) by submitting components containing socket or urllib imports. This enables AWS credential theft via IMDSv1 SSRF, arbitrary file exfiltration, and lateral movement to internal services (PostgreSQL, Redis) within the Docker network. The scanner incorrectly reports "validated": true, providing a false security signal.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Langflow component submission and execution sandbox, Docker network isolation. Internal database and cache services behind the Docker network are directly reachable from compromised Langflow instances.

Source: https://www.ibm.com/support/pages/node/7278919

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-69259CVSS 8.8 · HIGH

Summary: Flowise prior to 3.1.3 allows an authenticated attacker to overwrite the SQLite database path via `additionalConfig.database` in the SQLite Record Manager node. Running as root in the published Docker image, the attacker can write a SQLite database to paths like `/etc/chromium/exploit.conf` and inject shell syntax triggered when Puppeteer launches Chromium and sources `/etc/chromium/*.conf`.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Flowise SQLite Record Manager node, Puppeteer/Chromium integration. Arbitrary code execution occurs in the context of browser automation.

Source: https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/pull/6464, https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/releases/tag/flowise@3.1.3, https://github.com/FlowiseAI/Flowise/security/advisories/GHSA-x3hf-7cj6-3r4m

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-82430CVSS 7.8 · HIGH

Summary: Apache Storm's `worker-launcher` changes ownership of the worker directory to an untrusted topology user before reading the supervisor-written command file. The file is opened without `O_NOFOLLOW` or owner re-verification, allowing a TOCTOU race where the tenant replaces the command file with an attacker-authored root-equivalent container invocation (arbitrary `-v`, `--device`, `--cap-add`, `--security-opt`, `--user`, `--net` flags). The same window applies to OCI workers with structural-only mount validation.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Apache Storm Docker and OCI worker isolation, topology submission. A compromised supervisor can yield root-equivalent container execution with host filesystem access.

Source: https://lists.apache.org/thread/8d5pkn486p8vrz5klg6onk5r8k9sd9lv, http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/13/10

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-53717CVSS 6.5 · MEDIUM

Summary: Envoy Gateway's controller follows tenant-controlled Wasm image URLs and uses untrusted tar-header `h.Size` values to allocate memory before validation. A crafted tar header can claim multi-terabyte size, causing unrecoverable Go runtime OOM. Since the CR persists, the controller repeatedly crash-loops, causing cluster-wide control-plane denial of service.

Affected Features / Interoperability: EnvoyExtensionPolicy Wasm plugin binary fetching, shared gateway controller reconciliation loop. Single-request, non-volumetric cluster-wide outage.

Source: https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9171, https://github.com/envoyproxy/gateway/pull/9172

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-54248CVSS 6.5 · MEDIUM

Summary: Doco-CD prior to 0.90.1 has a trust-boundary flaw where OCI artifact contents can influence the verification policy used for that same artifact. An attacker with write access to the OCI tag can publish an unsigned artifact containing `.doco-cd.yml` with `oci.verify: false`, bypassing signature verification.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Doco-CD OCI artifact deployment, GitOps continuous delivery pipeline. Deployment integrity depends on artifact contents being treated as trusted for trust-policy decisions.

Source: https://github.com/kimdre/doco-cd/pull/1407, https://github.com/kimdre/doco-cd/releases/tag/v0.90.1, https://github.com/kimdre/doco-cd/security/advisories/GHSA-5rv3-qpp3-6jp5

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-50025UNSCORED

Summary: Mousehole's HTTP/WebSocket management boundary is reachable without application-layer authentication. The service stores and reuses a MAM session cookie across state, public API responses, and WebSocket updates. Any client reaching the published port can read cookie-bearing state, replace the stored cookie, or force MAM update side effects. Docker's `5010:5010` publishing syntax can expose this on mixed-trust LAN/VPN interfaces.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Mousehole MAM session management, WebSocket state updates, public API. Cookie hijacking enables unauthorized seedbox IP management.

Source: https://github.com/t-mart/mousehole/security/advisories/GHSA-v64r-gfrc-f6vq, https://github.com/t-mart/mousehole/blob/master/CHANGELOG.md#v040---2026-06-04

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-52824UNSCORED

Summary: Kimai prior to 2.58.0 ships the official Docker image with `APP_SECRET` set to the public default `change_this_to_something_unique`, and the entrypoint neither replaces nor rejects it. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a username and can guess the associated account ID (for accounts without 2FA) can forge HMAC-protected authentication artifacts, including `KIMAI_REMEMBER` cookies and login links.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Kimai authentication system, `KIMAI_REMEMBER` cookie integrity, login link validation. All accounts without active 2FA are vulnerable to session forgery.

Source: https://github.com/kimai/kimai/security/advisories/GHSA-jr9p-4h4j-6c58, https://github.com/kimai/kimai/releases/tag/2.58.0, https://www.kimai.org/en/security/ghsa-jr9p-4h4j-6c58

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-55630CVSS 0.0 · NONE

Summary: Kiwi TCMS prior to 16.1 accepts unsanitized input in `TestCase.extra_link` and `TestPlan.extra_link`, creating a stored XSS opportunity. However, official Docker images and unmodified middleware send a Content-Security-Policy header that blocks inline JavaScript, making exploitation difficult in default deployments.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Test case and test plan link rendering, stored XSS attack surface. Custom deployments with weakened CSP remain vulnerable.

Source: https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/security/advisories/GHSA-473p-56xx-vg67, https://github.com/kiwitcms/Kiwi/releases/tag/v16.1

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-55887UNSCORED

Summary: MCP Gateway 0.21.0–0.42.2 unmarshals attacker-controlled `io.docker.server.metadata` OCI image labels into the broad `catalog.Server` structure. Runtime-shaping fields (Volumes, User, ExtraHosts) are appended to the `docker run` argument vector without an origin allowlist, allowing a malicious image author to request host filesystem or Docker socket mounts and UID 0 execution. Not prevented by no-new-privileges since no in-container privilege escalation is required.

Affected Features / Interoperability: MCP Gateway image pulling and server catalog handling, Docker container creation parameters. Container creation-time boundary bypass enables arbitrary host code execution.

Source: https://github.com/docker/mcp-gateway/security/advisories/GHSA-r2xf-7jw5-pjg6, https://github.com/docker/mcp-gateway/releases/tag/v0.42.2

Actions:

DockerCVE-2026-77179UNSCORED

Summary: On macOS, Docker Sandboxes' virtio-fs host server improperly follows symlinks when reopening an unlinked file from a stored path. A malicious guest can replace a parent directory with a symlink, escape the shared workspace, and read or modify arbitrary host files as the VMM user, potentially achieving host code execution.

Affected Features / Interoperability: Docker Sandbox virtio-fs file sharing, macOS host file system isolation. Guest-to-host boundary is compromised through symlink following.

Source: https://docs.docker.com/ai/sandboxes/security/isolation/, https://github.com/docker/sbx-releases/releases/tag/v0.41.0

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